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NOTES
BANKRUPTCY -

SUMMARY

JURISDICTION

Katchen, accommodation maker of notes given by a corporation, had sole control of a "trust account" in which corporate
funds were placed after a disastrous fire. From this account
Katchen made payments on the notes; within four months, the
bankruptcy of the corporation occurred. Katchen presented two
claims against the bankrupt, one for other payments, made
on the notes from his personal funds and one for rent due. The
trustee in bankruptcy asserted that the payments on the notes
from the trust account were voidable preferences to Katchen
under section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act,' and section 57g 2 required disallowance of claims of creditors holding voidable preferences. He then demanded summary judgment against Katchen
for the amount of the preferences. Overruling Katchen's objection to the exercise of summary jurisdiction,3 the referee rendered judgment for the trustee and ruled that Katchen's claims
were to be allowed only after satisfaction of the judgment
against him for the preference. The district court and court of
appeal affirmed. The United States Supreme Court held, the
Bankruptcy Act confers summary jurisdiction on the bankruptcy court to compel surrender of a voidable preference that
under section 57g would require disallowance of the claim.
Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 823 (1966).
1. Bankruptcy Act § 60, 64 Stat. 24 (1950), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 96
(1963) : "Preferred Creditors. a. (1) A preference is a transfer as defined in this
Act, of any of the property of a debtor to or for the benefit of a creditor for or
on account of an antecedent debt, made or suffered by such debtor while insolvent
and within four months before the filing .by or against him of the petition initiating a proceeding under this Act, the effect of which transfer will be to enable
such creditor to obtain a greater percentage of his debt than some other creditor
of the same class."
Katchen was alleged to be given a preference because payment on the notes
inured to his benefit, he being an accommodation maker.
2. Bankruptcy Act § 57(g) : "The claims of creditors who have received or
acquired preferences, liens, conveyances, transfers, assigiments or encumbrances,
void or voidable under this Act, shall not be allowed unless such creditors shall
surrender such preferences, liens, conveyances, transfers, assignments, or encumbrances."
3. The main reason the issue of summary versus plenary jurisdiction is important is that in the informal summary proceeding of the bankruptcy court,
the right to jury trial is not allowed.
[315]
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Prior to the instant case, the most restrictive view of summary jurisdiction to order a return of preferences void or voida4
ble under the act, represented by B. F. Avery & Sons v. Davis,
held that the trustee might oppose claims under section 57g in
a summary proceeding, but that in the absence of the claimant's
consent summary proceedings for return of property could be
maintained only when at the time of bankruptcy the property in
question was in the possession of or for the bankrupt, or where
the claimant's claim to the property was merely colorable or
sham. In Avery the court found no consent to summary jurisdiction and found that the property alleged to have been transferred preferentially was in the possession of the claimant under
a substantial claim of right; therefore, summary proceedings
were stayed until the preference issue could be tried by plenary
proceeding in a non-bankruptcy court.
A more liberal view distinguished between permissive and
compulsory counterclaim and allowed the bankruptcy court to
grant affirmative relief summarily only in the latter case.5
However, claimants in bankruptcy proceedings were found to
consent implicitly to summary jurisdiction over compulsory counterclaims, because they would normally expect the court to
6
consider evidence relevant to the claim.
The third theory maintained that when one presents a claim
to the bankruptcy court, one consents by implication to summary jurisdiction over all issues necessary to dispose of the
claim in all cases where the trustee would have a 57g objection
7
or where the counterclaim is related to his claim.
In Katchen the Court reasserted its power to determine, in
the absense of specific legislation, the scope of summary juris-,
diction." Finding Congress 'intended that bankruptcy proceed4. 192 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1951).
5. Permissive counterclaims as distinguished from compulsory are defined
in FED. It. CIv. P. 13: "(a) Compulsory Counterclaims-A pleading shall state as
a counterclaim any claim which at the time of serving the pleading the pleader
has against any opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence
that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim.
"(b) Permissive Counterclaims-A pleading may state as a counterclaim any
claim against an opposing party not arising out of the transaction or occurrence
that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim."
6. See Peters v. Lines, 275 F.2d 919 (9th Cir. 1960); Dwyer v. Franklin,
350 U.S. 995 (1956); In re Majestic Radio & Television Corp., 227 F.2d 152
(7th Cir. 1955) ; In re Solar Mfg. Corp., 200 F.2d 327 (3d Cir. 1952).
7. Interstate Nat'l Bank of Kansas City v. Luther, .221 F.2d 382 (10th Cir.
1955).
8. 382 U.S. at 328.
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ings be as quick and inexpensive as possible, 9 the Court extended
summary jurisdiction to encompass ordering a claimant to surrender a voidable preference that under section 57g would

require disallowance of his claim.10

Here, the claim for re-

imbursement for payment of corporate notes out of Katchen's
personal funds was clearly related to the trustee's motion under
57g based on allegedly preferential payments made from the
corporate trust account on the same notes; they arose from
the same subject matter." The Court would necessarily have
to determine the preference issue in deciding whether 57g required disallowance of the claim, thus leaving nothing to be
2
determined in a later plenary proceeding.'
Moreover, the Court indicated that Katchen does not reach
the limits of summary jurisdiction, for the reason that summary
jurisdiction will extend to claims where the 57g objection is to
transactions unrelated to the claim.' 3 Reliance on broad equity
principles from Alexander v. Hillman14 implies further that the
Court may perhaps extend summary jurisdiction to all cases in
which the claimant has presented a claim against the estate, 15
9. Id. at 328.
10. Id. at 335.
11. In re Majestic Radio &. Television Corp., 227 F.2d 152, 156 (7th Cir.
1955) ; In re Solar Mfg. Corp., 200 F.2d 327 (3d Cir. 1952).
12. The Court in Katchen clearly rejected the approach taken in
Avery, in
that in Katchen the Court said: ."[O]nce it is established that the issue of
preference may be summarily adjudicated absent an affirmative demand for
surrender of the preference, it can hardly be doubted that there is also summary
jurisdiction to order the return of the preference. This is so because in passing
on a § 57g objection a bankruptcy court must necessarily determine the amount
of preference, if any, so as to ascertain -whether the claimant, should he return the
preference, has satisfied the condition imposed by § 57g on allowance of the
claim. . . . Thus, once a bankruptcy court has dealt with the preference issue
nothing remains for adjudication in a plenary suit." 382 U.S. at 333-34.
13. If the dictum of Katchen is f llowed it will overrule the cases in note 6
supra to the extent that 57g objections will be extended to permissive as well as
compulsory counterclaims, and the bankruptcy court will have summary jurisdiction over voidable preferences where the 57g objection could be sustained. Katchen,
v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 330 (1966). "The linguige of this section it will be
observed, is concerned with creditois 'rather than claims and thus contemplates
that allowance of a claim may be conditioned on surrender of preferences received
with respect to the transactions unrelated to the claims. The exact reach of
§ 57g is not entirely settled . . . and that question is not involved here."
14. Alexander v. Hillman, 296 U.S. 222 (1935).
15. The Court in Katchen said that though Hillman is a case dealing with a
receivership, what was said in Hillman is equally applicable to bankruptcy. In
Hillman the Court was dealing with the issue of summary jurisdiction of four
counterclaims some of which were permissive counterclaims. The Court in granting summary jurisdiction to all the counterclaims said : "It would seem that
necessarily most of the issues in respect of the counterclaim will be quite similar
to those litigated in the main suit. Unquestionably all matter in the controversies
between the parties may be tried and determined more conveniently and promptly
in the receivership court than elsewhere. . . . Nothing is more clearly a part of
the main suit than recovery of all that to the 'res' belongs." Alexander v. Hillman,
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even though the trustee might not invoke 57g. Such an issue
was raised in Katchen but was not brought to the Supreme Court.
Carl E. Heck, Jr.

BANKRUPTCY -

UNRECORDED FEDERAL TAX LIENS - RIGHTS OF
A TRUSTEE UNDER SECTION 70c OF THE BANKRUPTCY ACT

Trustee in bankruptcy sought to invalidate an unrecorded
federal tax lien on the property of the bankrupt, alleging that
section 70c of the Bankruptcy Act gave him the status of a
"judgment creditor," thereby enabling him to prevail over the
unrecorded tax lien. The referee invalidated the lien, and his
decision was upheld by the district court and court of appeals.'
The United States Supreme Court affirmed; held, a federal tax
lien unrecorded at the time of bankruptcy is invalid against the
trustee. United States v. Speers, 382 U.S. 266 (1965).
Since the trustee in bankruptcy represents general, or unsecured creditors,2 his primary objective is to preserve as much
of the assets of the bankrupt as possible for distribution to this
class. To foster this objective and to protect the bankrupt estate
against secret liens the trustee has been vested with title to the
bankrupt's property superior to unrecorded liens. 3 The first significant legislation gave the trustee the rights of a creditor with
a judicial lien on all property of the bankrupt in the custody of
the court and with the rights of a "judgment creditor" as to all
other property. 4 Three years later, by amendment of the prede296 U.S. 222, 242 (1935).

The "res" in Hillman was the receivership, but by

analogy in a bankruptcy case the "res" would be the bankrupt estate.
1. In the Matter of Kurtz Roofing Co., 335 F.2d 311 (6th Cir. 1964).
2. Bankruptcy Act § 44c, 30 Stat. 544 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 110
(1958)
[hereinafter cited as Bankruptcy Act] : "The creditors of a bankrupt
. . . shall, at the first meeting of creditors . . . appoint a trustee." .
Bankruptcy Act § 56(b): "Creditors holding claims which are secured or
have priority ohall not . . . be entitled to vote at creditors meetings."
See also

generally 2

COLLIER,

BANKRUPTCY

§§ 44.02-44.20

(14th

ed.

1940)

[hereinafter cited as COLLIER]; 3 COLLIER §§ 56.02-56.11.
3. The first of these statutes, Bankruptcy Act § 70a (5) was sharply limited
as to its effectiveness by the case of York Mfg. Co. v. Cassell, 201 U.S. 344

(1906), which interpreted the provision to mean that the trustee was vested with
superior title

only where

creditors

existed

who

were similarly

protected

by

state law. In 4 COLLIER § 70.48, at 1401, the author stated: "Since under the
laws of many states, unrecorded mortgages, pledges, conditional sales, and the
like, as well as many other types of secured transactions dangerous to creditors,
are not valid except as to creditors who have levied upon or have fastened a
lien on the property in dispute, the York case sharply limited the usefulness of
the provisions of section 70a(5) ... .
4. 36 Stat. 838 (1910), now Bankruptcy Act §70c. The purpose of this

